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By the end of the eighteenth century, the achievements of the Enlighten-
ment had led to a perception that science and the literary arts were competing 
modes of endeavor, and a moment’s reflection shows us that this sense of disci-
plinary competition dies hard. Indeed, one of the chief occupations of literary 
studies today is in still sorting out the relationship between itself and other dis-
ciplines. It is not that earlier eras were blissfully void of feelings of interdiscipli-
nary rivalry—for two thousand years, literary critics from Aristotle to the Re-
naissance humanist Sir Philip Sidney had pitted literature against such human-
istic disciplines as philosophy and history, claiming that these fields are, respec-
tively, too abstract and too tied to facts to provide the moral and spiritual en-
lightenment available through literature—but that the threat to literature now 
emanated from a different sphere (Aristotle 32-33; Sidney 105-07). So it is that, 
at the turn of the nineteenth century, Wordsworth echoes Sidney’s remarks on 
philosophy, but his target is now science: scientific knowledge is difficult and 
learned, whereas poetic knowledge is coterminus with our own existence. Later 
English romantic and Victorian poet-critics, also opposing poetry to science, 
followed Wordsworth in asserting the emotional and consequently moral effec-
tiveness of literature. Thus, some two decades after Wordsworth penned the 
Preface to the Lyrical Ballads, Shelley insists that, in contrast to scientifically 
conceived moral systems (“ethical science,” in Shelley’s phrase), poetry acti-
vates the imagination and, in so doing, facilitates sympathetic responsiveness to 
others (487-88). And again, toward the end of the century, attuned to the intel-
lectual trends of his time and influenced deeply by Wordsworth, Matthew Ar-
nold claims that feeling is linked to conduct and that literature, which addresses 
our feelings, is therefore necessary in promoting our impulse toward moral be-
havior. In short, the competition between science and literature is no doubt a 
phenomenon of the past several hundred years; nonetheless, it is worth remem-
bering that literary study has always defended itself against and defined itself in 
relation to some other discipline, whose threat may be accordingly actual or illu-
sory. 
If, then, a marked pattern of nineteenth-century literary criticism was to ele-
vate literature above science in the process of defending its viability, a contrary 
tendency to assimilate scientific and pseudo-scientific research and models to 
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literary studies emerged simultaneously toward the end of that century, and es-
pecially marks twentieth-century approaches to literature. Shklovskian defamil-
iarization, anthropological and linguistic structuralism, psychoanalytic and 
Marxist criticism, to name a few—all are influenced and many inspired by work 
in nonhumanistic disciplines. Not surprisingly, with the emergence of an evolu-
tionary and cognitive approach to criticism today, both enthusiasts and skeptics 
are eager to learn what the implications of these disciplines are for literary stud-
ies. 
Today, we are all—enthusiasts, skeptics, and those in between—
participating in the larger historical drama of the relationship of literature to 
science, experiencing its sometimes destructively competitive, sometimes intel-
lectually productive, dimensions. This essay will argue that the objectives of the 
sciences and literature are in some ways fundamentally different, and that, if we 
keep these differences in mind while pursuing interdisciplinary literary criticism, 
evolutionary and cognitive literary criticism will be the more enduring for it. In 
particular, I claim that speculative thinking has a role within literary studies and 
the academy at large, and I attempt to demonstrate, in an analysis of a short pas-
sage from The Prelude, how empirically grounded research from behavioral 
ecology and related fields can enhance the speculative activity of literary inter-
pretation.  
Understandably, the disappointing results of a century’s worth of scientific 
attitudes and approaches to literature fuels a good deal of current skepticism. In 
a recent Poetics Today essay, Tony Jackson expresses ambivalence about the 
interpretive potential of evolutionarily informed criticism, and he forwards two 
interrelated criticisms of recent books touting the value of evolutionary theory 
for literary scholarship. Discussions of aesthetic processing, affective response, 
and the like in books by Robert Storey and Joseph Carroll, Jackson asserts, mis-
understand poststructuralism, conflating relativism with nihilism; furthermore, 
because these scholars do not see that poststructuralists would agree with their 
fundamental assumptions, they offer nothing new to literary criticism. Jackson 
thus raises two quite different issues, that of the epistemological foundations of 
poststructuralism and that of the interpretive possibilities of an evolutionary and 
cognitive criticism. Regarding the first issue, since in this essay Jackson does 
not engage with the epistemological arguments of poststructuralism’s critics in 
any detail, he does not establish that there is a legitimate distinction between 
relativism and nihilism, or that, more pertinently, whatever labels we may wish 
to affix to them, the truth claims of poststructuralists have been mischaracterized 
by those who argue their irrationalism or incoherence (Carroll, Evolution; East-
erlin, “Bioepistemology”; Livingston; Storey). I suspect, however, that debates 
about poststructuralist epistemology may go on forever, never sharing a precise 
terminology (e.g., is there only one relativism?) and never producing convergent 
interpretations of passages from prominent theorists. Leaving epistemology 
  __________________________________________________________________________________ 
61 
 
aside for the moment, therefore, it is sufficient to point out that, because post-
structuralist critics have followed the lead of theorists who claim that cultural 
beliefs and artifacts are culturally constructed manifestations of ideology, an 
emphasis on evolutionary and biopsychological factors importantly enlarges our 
current picture of literary production and reception. What recent critics actually 
believe, as opposed to what their practice has been, is in an important sense be-
side the point. It may well be that poststructuralists have not recognized the epis-
temological implications of their truth claims, but those implications are none-
theless embedded in the strong constructionist emphasis of poststructuralist 
practice. In sum, Jackson is trying to dismiss an important corrective to extreme 
constructionism.  
However, Jackson’s second concern—that we do not yet know much about 
the implications for criticism of an evolutionary approach—is shared by many 
who already practice evolutionary and cognitive criticism, and deserves serious 
consideration. We need to step back and consider for a moment whether science 
has any actual value for literary studies. After all, so many of this century’s at-
tempts at scientific approaches have proved disappointing, producing not only 
repetitive readings but also (I think of Freud and Marx here) fallacious ones. Is 
this simply because literary studies has failed to be adequately subservient to 
science, and has therefore chosen the wrong paradigms—the anti-empirical and 
pseudo-scientific rather than genuinely scientific—upon which to base its inter-
pretations? As Richard Levin points out, contemporary critics who choose inter-
pretive models without confirming their currently perceived truth-value within 
the parent discipline (the Oedipus complex within psychology, for example) are 
in many respects responsible for the poor state of interdisciplinary knowledge 
within literary studies. On the other hand, scientists like Paul R. Gross and Nor-
man Levitt, because they find no examples of scientific theories applied accu-
rately to literary criticism, suggest that humanists just shouldn’t meddle with 
science, fated as they are to get it all wrong. So should we just give up, each go 
his separate way and never the twain shall meet—methodological dualism tri-
umphant to the last? What is the proper relation of literature to science, anyway?  
To answer such questions about interdisciplinary literary studies, we need 
first to define the discipline and then to determine how its goals and objectives 
compare to scientific disciplines. However, because the academic study of litera-
ture has a fairly short history, and because the perceived purpose of literary 
study has varied considerably within that short history, the objectives of the field 
are not self-evident. According to Gerald Graff, there never has been a coherent 
professional tradition within English studies, which was in its earliest form 
based on opposed impulses toward Arnoldian humanism on the one hand and a 
drive toward professionalization influenced by science on the other. Indeed, both 
Graff and Terry Eagleton note that nineteenth-century education in England and 
America was tied to a patrician class leadership ideal, in which the study of phi-
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lology and literature were important components of the socializing function of 
the university, serving as arenas of cultivation and spiritualization in a society in 
which the explanatory (and therefore social) power of organized religion was on 
the wane. 
Few, if any, literary scholars today would envision the cultivation of a so-
cial elite and the indoctrination into spiritual values as the goals of their disci-
pline, even if, unfortunately, the first of these is in many ways supported by the 
dynamics of higher education and the second remained an overt goal at least 
through the New Criticism. To be sure, most poststructuralists would point out 
at this juncture that their endeavors aimed precisely at correcting the institution-
al reinforcement of social hierarchy embedded in literary studies and, notwith-
standing the many questionable epistemological and theoretical foundations of 
most poststructuralist interpretation, these critics have raised awareness of the 
ideological considerations underpinning attitudes towards literature. Should lit-
erary studies, then, in eschewing the pseudo-religiosity and social elitism of the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, pursue the course of cultural studies, 
endorsing the merger of its fields with humanities and social sciences such as 
philosophy, sociology, and history? If such a reorganization were vigorously 
pursued, one likely practical outcome would be a scholarly and pedagogical 
method in which literary works were valued for their capacity to exemplify gen-
eral cultural trends and ideas. Cultural studies, over the long term, might return 
us to a critical approach similar to that of old-fashioned literary history before 
the New Criticism introduced close textual analysis. Notably, however, this is 
not just a potentially undesirable result of constructionism: since the sciences, 
like the social sciences, investigate normative phenomena and patterns, scientif-
ically oriented literary critics, like advocates of cultural studies, should be at-
tuned to the tendency of other disciplines to assimilate literature to their own 
epistemic perogatives. 
At the heart of the matter, then, is whether literature still merits an inde-
pendent discipline and, if so, how one engages in interdisciplinary criticism 
while preserving the integrity of literary studies. Northrop Frye once maintained 
“that criticism has a great variety of neighbors, and that the critic must enter into 
relations with them in any way that guarantees his own independence”; although 
critics of nearly every stripe today do not endorse Frye’s dismissal of interdisci-
plinary approaches, they should nevertheless consider whether “literary values” 
exist distinct from the values of other disciplines (Anatomy 19). If such “literary 
values” no longer exist, then critics need no longer be concerned about their 
independence. As we have seen, we cannot turn to the history of literary studies 
within the academy to find a special rationale for our area, but it is nevertheless 
fairly easy to formulate one. As centers of learning, universities are devoted to 
the accumulation and dissemination of knowledge, and that knowledge is com-
prised not only of the accumulation and analysis of facts but also of various 
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kinds of reflection about why things and people are the way they are and why 
human knowledge is constituted as it is. Reflection is a vital part of intellectual 
endeavor because knowledge is constrained and shaped by the human brain, 
which predisposes us to attend to our environment in ways best adapted to sur-
vival. Even though our capacity to accumulate empirical knowledge is growing 
all the time, it still falls far short of comprehending the complex processes of our 
world, of ourselves, and of the cosmos, and our need to hypothesize, reflect, and 
speculate about phenomena in ways that are not amenable to empirical tests is 
not only vital to our survival but a crucial counterpart to objective research. 
Literature has arisen during the course of modernization, so that in the past 
few thousand years, but especially in the last six hundred, developing cultures 
have produced a sizable quantity of written work in various genres and modes. 
Since this body of work is substantial, and since these cultural artifacts repre-
sent, reflect upon, and record human culture, they are worthy of study within 
universities. They enhance our capacity for reflection both through the reflec-
tions they themselves offer and through the reflections they inspire in the critical 
mind. Unlike biological organisms, literary works are the products of individual 
minds, and each is unique; furthermore, because of the pace of cultural evolu-
tion, styles, attitudes, forms, and other specific features of literature are in a con-
stant process of change. Yet in spite of this overwhelming variety, literary works 
exhibit enough regularities to constitute what Frye calls a verbal universe, a co-
herent, dynamic, distinct yet integrated body of artifacts. 
In contrast to literary scholarship and teaching, which combines the study of 
norms and patterns with that of individual works, the sciences and social scienc-
es primarily seek to elucidate normative features of phenomena or systems, 
whether of biological organisms, psychological development, social systems, 
physical laws, or the like. Such an objective is especially compatible with empir-
ical method, and works best, as E. O. Wilson himself points out, for the simplest 
kinds of phenomena (Consilience). Literary works can be studied empirically, 
and in a wide variety of ways—to determine reader response (Miall); to eluci-
date the relationship between character and writer psychology (David Sloan 
Wilson; Near; and Miller); to discover aggregates of information carried in nar-
rative (Scalise Sugiyama)—and such studies stand to offer vital new information 
about how literature is created and received as well as what it conveys. But they 
should never be seen as superior to the necessarily speculative enterprise of in-
terpreting individual literary texts. It is possible that someday we will have ac-
quired so much factual information about literature that the speculative enter-
prise of interpretation will no longer be necessary, but from our current vantage 
point, it’s impossible to imagine such a situation. 
To endorse speculation as a valuable and even necessary activity within lit-
erary studies, however, is by no means to cast one’s lot with the epistemic rela-
tivists who believe that ideas are self-legitimating. The truth status of ideas with-
 __________________________________________________________________________________ 
64 
in their parent disciplines (regarding, for example, the function of mother-infant 
interaction; the relative biopsychological differences between the sexes; the ae-
tiology of homosexuality; the law of gravity, etc.) should be of absolute concern 
to the literary critic. A literary interpretation is only as good as the critic who 
pens it, and these days the conscientious critic is well advised to bring broad 
knowledge to the interpretive task. Biography, history, linguistics, sociology, 
economics, biology, psychology—all can provide significant information about 
why one work became the thing it is and means as it does. Moreover, among this 
complex of factors that impinges on literary creation, none is self-evidently 
more significant than another, so that the attempt to establish the kind of meth-
odological control available in science, beyond the close attention to the text, 
would be seriously disabling to the art of interpretation. 
On the one hand, bioevolutionary critics should apply their literarily trained 
judgment to the interpretation of texts; on the other, they should exploit their 
available knowledge of evolution, psychology, and the like as well as follow the 
lead of intuition in exploring areas in social and natural science that might in-
form and enhance the speculative enterprise. Even if criticism is inevitably 
speculative, given the complexity of literary works, all critics are constrained to 
borrow from their neighbors in an informed and accurate fashion.  
The lack of a rationally articulated model or set of directives for evolution-
ary and cognitive criticism, finally, while an apparent shortcoming to scholars 
like Jackson, is in my view the great advantage of this new approach. Returning 
to the history of literary theory, has it not been the late twentieth century’s ten-
dency to subdivide into various schools, each with its own mission statement 
and paradigm for interpretation, that has resulted in so many two-dimensional 
and suspiciously familiar readings? Evolutionary and cognitive criticism could 
become like this, but in so doing would betray not only our commitment to what 
Matthew Arnold calls humane letters, but to Darwinism itself. 
A commitment to the theory that we have evolved through a process of nat-
ural selection and, further, to the conviction that our evolution has implications 
for our universal human psychology, does not entail a specific direction for lit-
erary research or require us to contemplate a narrower range of concerns. Dar-
winism, to the contrary, broadens the scope of literary inquiry and may offer 
something of a cure for the recent fragmentation and ensuing trivialization of the 
field. Whereas poststructuralism has limited all explanations to sociocultural 
phenomena and thus drastically curtailed causal explanation, a Darwinian per-
spective provides a grounding theory that is itself dynamic and that, therefore, 
invites consideration of causal processes and complex dynamics. Darwinism, 
like systems theory and chaos theory, which have served as fruitful models for 
the analysis of social systems in political science and of human ontogeny in psy-
chology, encourages us to take a long-term view of complex processes while 
simultaneously offering us a plausible theory of the origin of human beings. 
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In the remainder of this essay, I will discuss the cultural and biological as-
sociations evoked by a single word in a famous passage from Wordsworth’s 
Prelude to demonstrate the kind of empirically grounded speculation I believe 
an authentically evolutionary perspective invites. Two major concerns of this 
interpretation—first, how a very particular arrangement of words affects (many) 
readers emotionally, and second, how this emotional reaction impinges on our 
aesthetic judgment of the passage—are far too complex to be amenable to em-
pirical constraints. At the same time, the emotional action of a poem and the 
resulting value judgments a culture makes of it seem to me to be among the 
most vital concerns of the literary critic.  
Rather than working from theoretical presuppositions and social scientific 
findings down to the literary work, I proceeded from my longstanding interest in 
Wordsworth and in the force of this passage to literary criticism and to those 
fields—environmental aesthetics, environmental psychology, and behavioral 
ecology—that potentially offered insight into the likely response of a reader to 
this particular passage. Because this and other interpretive essays of mine syn-
thesize cultural explanation with bioevolutionary explanation, I call my critical 
approach biocultural or Darwinian, and because any piece of scholarship bring-
ing together such a range of analyses and attempting to suggest how they are 
relevant to the reader’s experience cannot prove the legitimacy of its claims, its 
conclusions are necessarily speculative.  
The lines I will focus on here appear in the now-famous passage in which 
Wordsworth apostrophizes the imagination in Book VI, “Cambridge and the 
Alps,” which forms the textual, chronological, and dramatic center of the poem 
about the growth of the poet’s mind. Wordsworth calls attention to this series of 
lines by juxtaposing his narrative of a disappointing past moment with a present 
epiphany and by the elevated, assured rhetoric he here adopts. During a walking 
tour of the Alps, as Wordsworth retells it, he and his companion Robert Jones, 
far from experiencing an influx of sublimity as they crossed the Alps, did not 
even realize that they had made the crossing and begun their descent until they 
questioned a peasant. At this point, the dramatically present writing poet, inter-
rupting his chronological narrative, recognizes that such failure of insight attests 
to the working of imagination through the disruption of expectation: enlighten-
ment is not a product of a well-made plan for perceiving the beautiful and sub-
lime, but occurs at unanticipated moments, though it must also, paradoxically, 
be sought. Without warning, “when the light of sense/Goes out in flashes that 
have shewn to us/The invisible world,” the imagination provides mystical access 
to the ultimate nature of things (VI.534-36). From the recognition of the awe-
some power of imagination, Wordsworth gleans this truth: 
Our destiny, our nature, and our home, 
Is with infinitude—and only there; 
With hope it is, hope that can never die, 
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Effort, and expectation, and desire, 
And something evermore about to be. (VI.538-42) 
Wordsworth makes both an eschatological and ontological claim, since both 
becoming (“destiny”) and being (“nature”) are contained within—or perhaps 
even constitutive of—infinitude. The passage expresses a characteristically 
Wordsworthian paradox, asserting that goal-directed thought and behavior, 
forms of process, participate both physically and metaphysically in the apparent-
ly fixed and absolute (“nature” and “infinitude”). Paradoxical expression, a pre-
dominance of abstract nouns, and the emphatic series of threes give this passage 
its religious resonance, and the juxtaposition of this language with the prosaical-
ly recounted Alps crossing contributes significantly to its impact (Easterlin, 
Wordsworth). 
Taken in isolation, however, neither the passage’s language nor its import—
that all things partake of the larger entity of infinitude—is particularly remarka-
ble, with the exception of the word “home.” In the triumvirate “our destiny, our 
nature, and our home,” a seemingly everyday term is not only transposed into 
the infinite and ultimate, but receives the greatest emphasis as the final term in 
the progression. More concrete and affectively charged than the words “destiny” 
or “nature,” “home” gives this passage a special resonance and meaning that 
cannot be fully accounted for by cultural explanations alone. In what follows, I 
will explain how the word “home” has both special cultural and biological sig-
nificances that, in combination with the passage’s other aesthetic qualities (such 
as heightened rhetoric, the series of three, and numerous other factors) account 
for its perceived greatness. 
Cultural history tells us this: home, homesickness, and related terms gain 
currency with the greater mobility that comes with the beginning of urbaniza-
tion. Like religion a few centuries later, home is a thing that must be named 
when humans are threatened with its loss; it is taken for granted until one leaves 
and misses it. In a pre-poststructuralist era essay, Alan McKillop traces the first 
occurances of the Swiss-German term Heimweh, denoting homesickness-in-
exile, to 1596. Concurrent with this emerging yearning for home and its articula-
tion, interestingly, was an Enlightenment tendency to disparage natural or local 
attachment, opposing it to cosmopolitanism and to true patriotism. However, the 
longer classical tradition links cosmopolitanism with local attachment, and it 
might be said that Wordsworth reasserts this link with renewed force, for, as 
McKillop points out, local attachment generates the poet’s entire understanding 
of nature and man. If Enlightenment rationalism equated one’s love of native 
place with folk ignorance and superstition, Wordsworth’s response was that the 
folk, in nurturing “what is really important to men,” understand the emotional 
center of human existence and its restorative power. In Wordsworth’s concep-
tion, then, the feeling for home is not opposed to cosmopolitan experience but 
rather supplies the sustaining basis of broad experience. 
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Both McKillop’s history of ideas approach and the current cultural con-
structionist approach of literary criticism could be used to explain the poet’s 
valorization of home as a product of influential ideas or of hegemonic ideology, 
and it would be foolish to suggest that cultural effects are irrelevant to the poem. 
But it is also foolish to suggest that cultural explanations are sufficient or in fact 
separable from naturalistic explanations, for they cannot adequately account for 
the feelings of loss (and hence of attachment) embodied in Heimweh, for the 
high value placed on the notion of home. To say that these values and feelings 
are a product of culture only involves us in a specious circularity, begging the 
question of why feelings and values would be constructed in this way, especially 
since these feelings and values are apt to hamper the general socioeconomic 
trend of the time toward industrialization and attendant resettlement into urban 
locations. 
Research in environmental and social ecology on the concept of home indi-
cates that Wordsworth, in his use of the word “home” in this passage, is not 
simply transposing the personal and domestic into the transcendent, but return-
ing the concept to a pre-modern meaning in which intimate connections to place 
and person are coherently integrated into a way of being and set of beliefs. The 
tendency to oppose domestic existence and worldly success and to denigrate 
home in the process is a by-product of the intertwined phenomena of industriali-
zation, rationalism, and increasing differentiation of the roles of men and wom-
en. In contrast to the foundation myths of all cultures, in which the home and 
homeland are indispensible units of a larger coherent cosmology, the removal of 
work from the home with industrialization and the replacement of concrete 
products (crops and cattle) with abstract payment (money) disturbs the psychic 
continuity between work, which results in resources, and home, a place of re-
production and security for which resources are provided but which until recent 
centuries was the base of industry for men and women alike. Industrialization 
furthermore eroded the communal realm to which the family home was connect-
ed and which provided the link to larger social and spiritual structures. Indeed, 
rationalism’s bias toward the tangible likely provided the philosophical and ide-
ological support for this diminished concept of home, whose complex web of 
feelings cannot be quantified, and was perhaps deemed nonexistent (Dovey). 
McKillop’s analysis is certainly consistent with this observation, suggesting that 
the belittlement of local attachment resulted from rationalism, which cannot 
explain seemingly irrational attachments to place. Finally, the gradual dissocia-
tion of home from resource gathering and its exclusive reconceptualization as 
the domain of female nurture is a prime example of hypertrophy, the extreme 
extension of pre-existing structures, according to Wilson (Human Nature). If in 
hunter-gatherer culture women care for the young and seek resources near the 
home base while men venture farther afield to hunt, provision of resources for 
the family and larger group remains the clear goal. By contrast, industrialization 
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brought with it an alienation from the sense of shared goals and a denigration of 
home as the sphere of women and of sentimental feeling. 
Cultural critics might reasonably claim at this point that “home,” because of 
these many historical changes, simply means less as culture progresses, so that 
Wordsworth’s deification of home merely reflects the sentimental philosophy of 
his day—in which case, in my judgment, we would have to find his deification 
of home sentimental in the contemporary and generally pejorative sense—that 
is, a display of emotion in excess of the object. Such an analysis, however, 
would beg the question of what motivates eighteenth-century sentimentalism in 
the first place. Contrarily, investigation into the bioevolutionary nature of our 
attachments indicates that we still share many of the predispositions of our 
hunter-gatherer ancestors, and that our tendency to attach to places and persons 
would make the home-concept resonant, sometimes even perhaps in spite of 
culture’s sentimentalized constructions.  
Although “home” calls to mind many specific and concrete associations, it 
is a multivalent concept that evokes a broad and intangible array of connections 
to place, persons, past, present, and future. The phenomenological condition of 
being human, of being a physically discrete organism that must orient in adap-
tive ways, is facilitated by our emotional responsiveness to the environment 
(comprised of both our physical surroundings and other people) because those 
emotions are our primary motivators in our behavioral negotiation of our envi-
ronment (Orians and Heerwagen). During the major period of species evolution, 
human beings developed a pattern of being far-ranging but home-based animals, 
the twin needs of survival and reproduction being best served by both available 
nesting place and foraging ground (Kaplan; Appleton).  
In the nesting place, or what modern humans call the home, our emotions 
and interests first emerge, and their first object is the primary caregiver, usually 
the mother. As Yi-Fu Tuan puts it, “If we define place broadly as a focus of val-
ue, of nurture and support, then the mother is the child’s primary place. Mother 
may well be the first enduring and independent object in the infant’s world of 
fleeting impressions. Later she is recognized by the child as his essential shelter 
and dependable source of physical and psychological comfort” (29; also Ogden). 
Indeed, developmental research suggests that infants progress from an early in-
terest in the eyes and face of the mother to a fascination with objects in the envi-
ronment (at about four months), although all the while attachment to the mother 
is strengthening (Stern; Bowlby). Thus, while the initial bond to the mother is a 
precursor to interest in the physical environment, the tie to place, to home, has 
much to do with the strong association between the bond with the mother and 
the secure and familiar physical surroundings. This is to surmise that our feel-
ings for home may not only be similar to our feelings for our mothers, but indis-
tinguishable from them, and may even extend beyond the home/shelter to the 
landscape itself. In light of this, strong positive feelings for one’s mother and 
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childhood home, rather than being, as Freud theorizes, symptoms of regression 
to an undifferentiated union of primary narcissicism, would attest to the early 
capacity to discriminate sources of care and places of security, and to compre-
hend emotionally their primary and indispensible role in the human individual’s 
future growth and viability (Easterlin, “Psychoanalysis”). Since the proper ori-
entation of the body in space means staying alive, the persons and places that 
have contributed to our survival at our most vulnerable stages should, adapta-
tively speaking, be objects of strong attachment. 
In addition to these insights from developmental psychology, evolutionary 
psychology and environmental aesthetics offers hypotheses about habit prefer-
ence that reinforce our understanding of strong attachment to the first environ-
ment, in which mother, shelter, and locale are, in their emotional content, pro-
foundly associated. As Elieser Hammerstein explains in a brief essay on the be-
havioral biology of migrants, the German word Heimat, connoting a spiritual-
ized home, is “usually referred to as the place where one grew up and to which 
one is emotionally attached. This attachment is similar to habitat imprinting in 
animals, arising by way of continuous, emotionally loaded association learning” 
(3). Evolutionary biology theorizes that habitat imprinting, most especially 
through the triggering of emotions, assists creatures in habitat selection, and thus 
improves the likelihood of survival. A mechanism of this kind would have been 
adaptive for our hunter-gatherer ancestors who, much more than ourselves, 
needed to be sensitive to their physical environment to ensure survival. Howev-
er, as Hammerstein points out, the development of intimate relationships in a 
new place often overrides feelings of homesickness, new feelings and associa-
tions supplanting the old to a significant degree. Whereas the imprinting theory 
suggests that we will become attached to our early habitat or environment no 
matter what its topography, studies in environmental aesthetics indicate that 
humans are predisposed to prefer savannah-type landscapes. While this observa-
tion seems to contradict Hammerstein’s imprinting theory, neither theory as-
sumes that learning patterns or preferences are hard-wired. We are, as Wilson 
explains, prepared to learn certain preferences and antipathies, but whether these 
predispositions become manifested in our psychology and behavior is a function 
of individual circumstance (Consilience). Obviously, the degree to which an 
imprinting mechanism for a city-dweller battles with a universal predisposition 
to love savannah landscapes requires further research; but for the purposes of 
this essay, it is notable that both the imprinting theory and the innate preference 
theory claim that the native place, whatever its topography, predictably elicits 
strong feelings. 
In sum, bioevolutionary research on early emotional bonds, on habitat im-
printing, and on visual preferences in landscape show that humans are highly 
prepared to develop a strong attachment to “home,” whether this word means 
the proximate natural environment, the house or shelter, the family (especially 
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the mother), or all of these. Thus, McKillop’s cultural explanation of the emer-
gent value of “home” in the sixteenth century does not supercede but supple-
ments these biological explanations, since the migrations and relocations that are 
a part of modern life, attended as they are by dislocations and loss, provoke con-
sciousness of our deep and primary attachments. In The Prelude, Wordsworth 
exploits the biocultural relevance of the word “home,” a word resonant for his 
culture and ours because the social changes that made the word so telling are 
even more a part of our lives today than they were two hundred years ago; yet at 
the same time, without a deep, biologically based connection to place, it is not 
likely that the word could have developed its profound cultural significance.  
Of course, “home” will not carry these resonances for every reader for a va-
riety of reasons, the most obvious of which is that for circumstantial reasons 
(life-threatening weather, poverty, parental abuse or neglect, for example) not 
everyone will have positive feelings for his place of birth, his house, or his 
mother. But that is not the point. It is reasonable to predict that, however cogni-
tive connections are made between abstract linguistic signs and emotions, the 
word “home” is likely, on average, to evoke some of our earliest and most fun-
damental feelings, those on which our later social and emotional development 
are based. Not for all, but certainly for most readers trained to appreciate poetry, 
then, “home” will trigger a complex of positive emotional associations rather 
different than the associations of “destiny” and “nature,” the two other terms in 
Wordworth’s triumvirate of nouns. 
At the moment in the poem when he conjures up the imagination and 
acknowledges its (presumably rhetorical) divinity, Wordsworth simultaneously 
subverts metaphysical dualism and the attendant suggestion that life in this 
world accedes to a higher existence and order of phenomena. The passage 
weaves a sense of security and of last things into a celebration of dynamic pro-
cess, and the emotionally laden term “home” is profoundly instrumental in the 
communication of holistic sensibility between writer and reader. The word asks 
the reader to reach back to his or her oldest experiences, and to think of human-
kind’s final destiny, which is, after all, the act of participating in “something 
ever more about to be,” as its home, its nesting place. In so doing, the poet re-
turns to the implications of the infant Babe passage in Book II, which suggests 
(with substantial accuracy, it turns out) that mother-infant mutuality is not only 
the basis of all later competences but the source for this poet’s abilities and, just 
as centrally, the reason the poem must be written (Easterlin, “Psychoanalysis”). 
Wordsworth’s use of the word “home” is at once novel and philosophically pro-
gressive—I would argue, more progressive than readers have ever fully real-
ized—and these things, along with its difficulty and religious resonance, con-
tribute to the striking quality of the passage. 
One could study the word “home” empirically by asking individuals what it 
means to them and, in a separate study, subjects could read the passage and re-
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spond to questions about its meaning, but neither experiment would reveal any-
thing about unconscious emotional associations. One could, as Miall has done, 
conduct MRI tests of brain activity during the reading process, and this would 
show us if people spend more time processing the term “home” than others in 
the passage, but it cannot reveal, again, the biopsychological or specific devel-
opmental substrate of the term. Even more to the point, perhaps, if I were to 
study this passage empirically, on what grounds would I justify my selection of 
these lines from a twelve-book poem as the focus of my experiment? If I were to 
model my method after the natural sciences, to aspire to the higher end of the 
scale of empirical constraint that Carroll has described, would I ever in my life-
time have enough reliable data to draw conclusions about the evocative reso-
nance and meanings of the poet’s language? (“‘Theory’”). Probably not. How-
ever, interpretation should be constrained and nurtured by the empirical findings 
of the scientists, social scientists, and humanists disposed to conduct such stud-
ies, so that our knowledge about what people are not only remains unified but 
develops through interdisciplinary exchange. 
The history of literary criticism demonstrates that narrowly conceived mod-
els of critical activity do not last very long, unresponsive as they are to the com-
plexities of literary works and to the dynamic place of those works in Frye’s 
ever-expanding verbal universe. That universe is our intellectual habitation and 
home, and so our voyages within it should be guided by our own charts and 
maps rather than by the route of a different kind of traveller whose office hap-
pens to be down the hall. 
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